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A NEW REGIME FOR EXPERT WITNESSES
RICHARD A. EPSTEIN
I. TORT REFORM OR PROCEDURAL REFORM
Most proposals for tort reform are efforts to mount a frontal assault against
a system that many believe to be deeply at odds with the best interests of our
legal social system. In the many years in which I have dealt with mass torts,
both as a scholar and as a consultant, I have become convinced that the
protracted struggles in litigation are a pointless social exercise that fail in all of
their fundamental objectives. The sprawling nature of the litigation consumes
enormous social resources, and the kinds of factual inquiries that are raised in
the cases require lawyers to develop extensive expertise in a wide range of
scientific, economic, and historical issues. In 1968 when I started to teach, the
paradigmatic tort was still the automobile collision at the intersection of Fourth
and Main, and serious scholars were asking whether the tort system had any
future at all, given that automobile no-fault insurance was likely to overtake
automobile liability, just as employer liability gave way to worker's
compensation laws.
Those predictions have, of course, proved to be wrong. Today tort
litigation is as likely to direct one to the state of medical knowledge in 1930 as
it is to be concerned with events in the here and now. The collection and
organization of data on so broad a front is a full time task that generates an
expertise of its own. I am happy to report that lawyers are not the only ones to
blame for this new found situation. They have received expert assistance
throughout - namely they have had the assistance of expert witnesses whose
services in a wide array of specialties are absolutely necessary to drive any
complex case from beginning to end. To be sure, experts have always been a
part of tort litigation. It is impossible for any medical malpractice action to
proceed without competent medical testimony, both on the standard of care and
on the question of causation and extent of injuries. Modem product liability
litigation brings a powerful demand for engineers and for psychologists, the first
to tell us about design and the second to tell us about warnings. And in all
cases economic experts are prepared to give precise indications of present and
future losses in the critical damage phase of a trial. So experts are here to stay.
' James Parker Hall Distinguished Service Professor of Law, The University of Chicago.
757
HeinOnline  -- 26 Val. U. L. Rev. 757 1991-1992
758 VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 26
But they are an expensive trinket. There are two ways in which one can
attack the problem. By the first, one can try to alter the substantive rules of the
game so as to reduce the complexity of the issues on which the experts are
forced to testify. If one had a rule for automobile accidents that said
noncompliance with the rules of the road were conclusive evidence of
negligence, then there would be somewhat less running room for experts to
comment on insanity and drunkenness, or to explain why this or that maneuver
should have been tried by a hard-pressed driver. The question would be, who
hit whom, or who had the right of way at the intersection? Similarly, if the
matter is one of product liability law, it will be far easier if the expert has to
testify whether the defect was latent or patent, than to testify if some alternative
device was (1) technically feasible at the time the product was sold, (2)
economically feasible, and (3) acceptable to consumers. The hypothetical
reconstruction of the market, so routinely demanded in tort litigation, is always
an arduous and uncertain task.
The resulting testimony on issues of this sort can easily conflict, given the
looseness of the underlying substantive rules. Yet what is a jury to do when
faced with sharp, clashing opinions of rival experts, each of whom sports
excellent credentials. One obvious strategy is to split the difference between the
two sides, on the view that moderation of the source of wisdom in a sea of
ignorance. But whatever the short term appeals of this strategy, it is a recipe
for institutional disaster. The mere fact that all experts may exaggerate does not
tell us in a particular case which expert has in fact exaggerated. It could well
be that one expert has told the truth in restrained fashion, while the expert for
the other side has shamelessly overstated his case. To average out these two
opinions is to award misconduct by half. While that result may be better than
accepting the testimony of the wrong expert as the gospel truth, by the same
token it is far inferior to accepting the testimony of the expert who has in fact
told the truth. There are few strategies that will allow a suspicious jury to do
the right thing in the face of its own ignorance.
II. LMrrING THE PowER OF EXPERT WrrNESSES
Ideally, the proper response to many of these problems with expert
evidence is to reform the substantive law. But often that path is blocked for
political and practical reasons. There is, however, a second way to attack the
difficulties of using expert witnesses: it is to ask what rules of procedure could
serve to eliminate the two most obvious defects to the current system of rules.
The first is the expense in expertise, and the second is the risk of bias and
coaching.
The present legal rules do relatively little to constrain the abuses of the
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system on either account. One possible area of reform, which Peter Huber' has
addressed, is making the requirements for expert testimony more stringent, as
was once required under the Frye rule.' The expert has to testify on the
strength of a received body of wisdom and cannot engage in extrapolation from
known data by way of novel theories. In essence, if there is evidence that drug
X can cause cancer of the liver, it is not enough to say that where there is
smoke there could also be fire. Hence, expert testimony that the drug could
cause cancer of the colon as well must be rejected, unless there is some clinical
study which shows that an interesting possibility is supported by some empirical
data. To be sure, some cases will be dismissed because they were brought in
advance of the scientific knowledge that established their validity. But by the
same token, many cases will be dismissed before further study shows that the
presumed connection could not be established. I think that reforms along this
line are important. But there are procedural matters to take into account as well.
One major effort to deal with bias is to say that experts cannot share in the
contingent fee arrangements that are charged by lawyers. The point is that their
neutral evidence cannot be bought or sold for money. But the indirect
inducements still remain. The expert who brings home the bacon in the first
case will be likely to command a larger fee for services in the next case. The
market for experts is well-developed, so that reputations can travel fast, and the
expert who has done well with lawyer A is likely to be able to capitalize on that
performance record with lawyer B in the next case. The rule against contingent
fees (and the power of cross-examination) may curtail the obvious forms of
blatant prejudice through which the jury is likely to see in any event.
Nonetheless, there are a lot of cases that are close to the line, and the expert
who labors with a powerful financial inducement (indirect to be sure), and a
close client identification is likely, just likely, to shade his opinion in favor of
his client's position. The point here has little to do with plaintiffs or defendants.
With human nature what it is, we can be confident that experts on both sides of
the line will be prey to this particular failing.
The problem of bias has another dimension, one which is closely linked to
the expense question. Expert witnesses are in close communication with clients
and lawyers from the moment that they are retained. They are coached by their
lawyers as to what they can and cannot say; they rehearse the questions that
they will be asked, and the answers that can be expected; they will help the
lawyer to break down the expert on the other side. The coaching costs a lot of
money, and it only increases the risk of bias as well. The question is what then
can be done about the situation assuming that experts remain as essential to tort
1. See generally PETER HUBER, GAULEO's REVENGE: JUNK SCIENCE IN THE COURTROOM
(1991); Peter Huber, Junk Science in the Courtroom, 26 VAL. U. L. REV. 723 (1992).
2. Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923).
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litigation as water is to human survival.
Consider this proposal. Each side is allowed to designate an expert, and
there its involvement in the management of the case comes at an end. The
power of designation (on which more later) carries with it no further rights.
The side that designates the expert is not allowed to speak to its expert; the
expert does not know the side that appointed him; and the materials in question
are furnished through the court, coupled with instructions that the expert can
make whatever additional inquiries are required, subject to a budget constraint.
If there are questions about the scope of the inquiry, they are referred back to
the court, where the matter can then be reviewed by counsel. The scheduling
of hearings is made by the court and not through the parties. At no point does
the expert know the party that has appointed him, and to pass that information
on is to risk serious penalty for both expert and lawyer alike. The expert is
forced to make decisions behind the veil of ignorance, and is only allowed to
guess who his client is. During the course of the trial, it may become apparent
who has hired the expert, but then again it might not. In this context the lawyer
could well seek to undermine his own expert if the testimony presented comes
in against the client's case.
The question remains, what ability do parties preserve for themselves when
they retain the power of designation? Here the point is a critical one, and for
two reasons. First, the proposal would be much easier to implement on a blank
slate. Today there are segments of the expert witness brigade that are organized
by sides. It will take, therefore, little imagination for most experts to know who
has hired them for this case. It is the same people who have hired them before.
The matter becomes even more obvious when the experts for each side have
taken published positions on certain issues (e.g. toxicity of agent orange, or
whatever), so that their public personae makes it clear the side that supports
them. But even here all is not lost, for there are two possible ways to control
the problem. First, the courts could adopt a rule that allows each side to veto
the choice of expert from the other side on a showing of cause (there are too
few experts in many areas to allow preemptory challenges on this point), which
showing depends on a demonstration of close involvement with one side of the
industry or another on the case. The problem here is a difficult one, to be sure,
for one side may be able to knock out the other's first choice of expert while his
own expert may well be able to escape condemnation. Any challenges should
look therefore not only at the one expert in isolation, but at the connection
between the two experts for the different ideas. This problem should in part,
however, be transitional, for if the system were widely adopted, then the next
generation of experts might be more clearly neutral than they are today.
The second point, however, remains. Even if the expert does have some
natural affinity with the side it chooses, there is a new level of independence that
760
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will be had, for the want of coaching should reduce the levels of the partisanship
that comes into the case, and surely the expense associated with trial
preparation. Any firm that wants can hire an expert to evaluate experts, which
is often done in large mass tort litigation today, but that expert will not be
allowed to testify at all in the basic case.
The question then arises what this reform will do to the overall operation
of the litigation system. It should, of course, reduce the delays and cost in
preparing a case for trial. The costs of the expert witnesses under the present
system are exceedingly high, and the simplification of the rule should do
something to reduce those costs substantially. After all, if the lawyer cannot
coach the witness, there is less reason to invest in the entire process. But how
should it influence the rate of settlement and the value of the settlement? In
general, I think that the use of two independent experts in a case should reduce
the variance in the assessments that are put forward to the court and the jury.
The closeness of those assessments should help each side frame its own
judgments as to the way the case is going. Before the experts get on the stand,
I think that the likelihood of settlement should increase. After they are on the
stand, it is likely that both sides will reform their estimations, but it is not likely
that their reassessments will lead to a further divergence of opinion, so that the
settlement rate should still become higher, even if the expected value of that
settlement could shift in one direction or another in consequence of what is
revealed at trial. I conclude, therefore, that the system could work if it were
tried.
But what are its chances of being tried? In the short run, I think that it is
most unlikely because of the widespread acceptance of the rule that each party
should have total dominance over the preparation of its case. Indeed, there is
no question that in individual cases, one side will value its choice of experts
more than the other. Armed with that information it is unlikely that the two
sides could agree to this proposal in any individual case. But in the broad run
of cases, the loss of case control should not be regarded as having that skewing
effect. The two parties do not know who they are, or what the particular
circumstances are that surround the case. At the more general level, there could
be greater sympathy for the result. But who will favor it? I suspect that
lawyers might be opposed, but it is difficult to be sure. The elimination of the
control over experts will reduce the cost of litigation, and surely the
management and deposition fees of lawyers. But by the same token, it will
make it possible, doctrine constant, to bring into the system a raft of cases that
are now outside it, simply because the barrier of hiring and retaining an expert
is too great. My sense, therefore, is that lawyers on the margin (i.e., without
real political power) would favor this proposal, whereas lawyers and firms,
much of whose expertise resides in the preparing of experts for trial, will be
opposed. The increase in business, even if favorable for the profession as a
1992]
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whole, may be directed toward other firms who will find it easier to enter the
tort business. But it is hard to say.
Nor is it clear how experts will regard the changes. It clearly gives them
less work to do per unit case, but that might be offset by an increase in the
number of cases that are prepared for trial. Or, it might allow experts who now
are reluctant to be tainted by the process to enter it, secure in the knowledge that
their independence receives greater protection and respect. Hence there, should
be a division of opinion, in which the masters under the present system are
likely to be most strongly opposed to any thorough going proposed reform. The
outsiders who might testify are not likely to become involved in the issue, except
perhaps through the operation of their professional societies.
I suspect, therefore, that the real champions of this reform are the clients
that are faced with repeated litigation over similar issues, to whom the cost of
expert witnesses are truly daunting. Since these firms have a large portfolio of
cases, they should be less concerned with the skewing effect in individual cases
than, say, plaintiffs who know their particular circumstances. In general, all
efforts at tort reform have been stymied at both the federal and state levels, and
it is likely for this to happen here, for the groups that have an interest in
retaining the present system appear to me to have the upper hand. In addition,
I think that the extensive reforms that I have just outlined are too far-reaching
for individual judges to impose case by case, and the selective imposition of the
rule could have enormous consequences that are difficult to calculate. But it is
perhaps possible for this to be done by the revision of the federal rules
themselves, or even by Congress, insofar as the matter is one that concerns the
operation of the federal court system. The problem is surely there, even if the
solution is not.
Even if the reforms are not adopted in full, there may be other approaches
that could be taken. One is to eliminate all discovery of all experts prior to
trial. Here the discovery of experts could often prove of little social value. It
may well be that the deposition will be perfunctory, as the lawyer conducting
it will want to hold back the heavy barrage until trial takes place. Alternatively,
if the initial attack is heavy, the expert under siege may be able to work out
clever replies to the challenges that are made. The mutual removal of the right
to take depositions should save costs, and should not have any bias one way or
the other. It seems to be worth a try, and could be implemented by judges
controlling the pace of litigation in individual cases.
A second more modest reform is one that limits the number of time that a
given party can use the same expert witness. To be sure, there is a certain
economy of scale in using the same expert witness in multiple cases: there is
less start up cost than if a new witness has to be prepped on each occasion. But
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there is the offsetting risk that the dependence between expert and client
becomes too great to ignore. Requiring the clients to switch experts forces them
to go to the market a second or third time, and thus breaks the stranglehold that
a single expert witness is able to exert over the entire process. Switching
experts between cases thus functions like a corroboration requirement, and hence
as a useful check against bias.
Im. A BROADER LOOK AT THE PROCEDURAL SYSTEM
The reexamination of the role of experts is long overdue, as is a
reevaluation of the entire rules of civil procedure, which were passed for a
simpler age of tort law. These procedural rules were adopted under the naive
view that parties would regard litigation as a joint and disinterested search for
the truth, instead of the all out slugfest that it has become today. The simplest
way in which to state the problem is as follows. The present Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure operate on two major assumptions that were wrong at the time
of their adoption in 1938, and that are devastating in their consequences today.
The first of these assumptions is that the parties should retain ironclad control
over their side of the litigation, including of course the right to depose witnesses
on the other side as a matter of course. The second of these assumptions is that
the rules should be drafted in ways that forgive inexperienced parties the
consequences of their errors, even if that introduces an additional element of
discretion into the rules. The first of these assumptions is a carryover from the
earlier system of code pleading, and the second was an effort to ameliorate
harsh consequences under a commendable maxim that procedural mistakes
should not be allowed to obscure the substantive merits of an individual case.
Both of these propositions contain serious errors. Regarding the first, the
autonomy principle is often sufficient (even in an age of class actions) to allow
the plaintiff to have exclusive control over his case and the defense over its case.
But that is a very different proposition from one that says that one can have
unlimited access to all the tools of the legal system in order to advance that
case. In the general tort law the limitation on the autonomy principle has always
been the harm principle: one cannot use one's own property in order to damage
the person or property of another. Once we come to see that litigation should
be understood as a form of constrained aggression, then the autonomy principle
must give way to some recognition that the advancement of one side imposes
heavy costs and legal obligations on the other. If you can demand deposition,
if you can propound complex interrogatories, if you can ransack the other
parties' files, then you can commit a form of aggression. We would never
allow the police unlimited power to enter, and we should not encourage a set of
rules whereby the major objective is to figure out some low cost inquiries that
are exceedingly costly for the other side to respond to. There has to be a
mutual nonaggression pact imposed by the state, whereby each side is
1992] 763
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compensated by the parallel restrictions that are imposed on the other side. The
question is how to maximize the net good out of litigation, that is, to find the
way to maximize the difference between gains from reliable outcomes and the
full costs necessary to achieve them. An unflinching respect for autonomy leads
to a dual ruin situation when conflict is at stake.
The second proposition, that we should organize the legal system to prevent
mistakes by innocent parties, is also misguided. It makes the mistake of
stopping one form of error, without taking into account the effects that the new
rules will have on a second form of error that has become ever more important
in the world of modem tort litigation. That second error is the ability of
powerful and successful lawyers to take strategic advantage of the rules, to
exercise a set of choices (when to file demurrer, when to ask for discovery or
continuance) in ways that can cause material difficulty to the other side. Stated
most forcefully, the play in the joints that allows the correction of innocent
mistakes in a few marginal cases has become in the hands of master litigators
the source of planned opportunism in the huge body of major tort litigation.
The jousting over experts, which is one part of the system of discovery, is just
one of the most pronounced illustrations of that problem., The rules have gone
out of control.
The entire episode with respect to expert witnesses is thus but one
important component of the entire reform over the rules of civil procedure. The
need for this reform, moreover, illustrates why we can expect the problem of
tort reform to remain so intractable in the years to come. Questions of
procedure have an intimate impact on the outcomes of tort cases, so that a
reform in one area is sure to influence the number of suits, the costs of
litigation, the rate of settlement, the settlement amount, the rate of litigation, and
through these factors costs of insurance, and the ultimate level of product
innovation and product pricing. It is, however, virtually impossible to give
precise estimates as to the dollar savings, let alone the social improvements
attributable to any single reform. It is also the case that the reforms in question
will influence not only tort litigation, but litigation in other arenas as well, so
that the constellation of relevant players includes many parties whose connection
with the tort system is remote. In this environment we should expect the
tyranny of the status quo. After all we have witness to the slender impact of
general tort reform at state levels, and the utter absence of tort reform at federal
level. The present law, subject only to judicial modifications that bypass the
political process, is where the debate begins. It is also likely, for better or
worse, to be where the debate ends as well.
764
HeinOnline  -- 26 Val. U. L. Rev. 764 1991-1992
